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SUPREME COURT HISTORY PROJECT
THE FIRST DECADE OF THE BURGER
COURT: CONSERVATIVE DOMINANCE (1969-
1979)*
Russell W. Galloway, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION
During the October 1968 Term the United States Su-
preme Court was more liberal than at any other time in its
history. The Court was controlled by a five-vote majority of
liberal-activist Justices (Douglas, Warren, Brennan, Marshall,
and Fortas). In addition, the liberal wing could count on sup-
port, in many divided cases, from Black, the Court's long-
standing liberal leader, who had moved into a moderate vot-
ing posture during the prior three Terms.' Moreover, among
the remaining three Justices (White, Stewart, and Harlan),
only one (Harlan) was really a conservative. The liberal wing
had dominated the Court since April 1962 and had pursued a
policy of judicial activism based on a philosophy of egalitari-
anism, libertarianism, and economic liberalism.2
Beginning in 1969, the Court underwent one of the most
dramatic alterations in its entire history.8 The liberal wing
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1. As commentators have frequently pointed out, statistical "movement" on the
part of a Justice is a relative concept. When a Justice moves toward one bloc and
away from another, the explanation may be that the rest of the Court has shifted its
position, while the Justice has remained static. Statements in this article concerning
the "movement" of Justices should, therefore, not be taken literally.
2. See Galloway, The Third Period of the Warren Court: Liberal Dominance
(1962-1969) (Supreme Court History Project, Publication No. 3), 20 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 773 (1980).
3. Other candidates for "most drastic short-term personnel change" include the
appointment of Taney and Barbour (1837), the loss of Miller and Bradley (1890-92),
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was decimated and the conservative wing rejuvenated by five
personnel changes. During the first half of 1969, the liberal
wing lost two of its members, Earl Warren and Abe Fortas.4
To replace them, President Nixon appointed Warren E.
Burger and Harry A. Blackmun. In August 1971, Hugo L.
Black and John M. Harlan resigned. To replace them, Nixon
appointed Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist. Fi-
nally, in 1975, William 0. Douglas resigned. To replace him,
President Ford appointed John P. Stevens.
In the aftermath of these five personnel changes, the lib-
eral wing was a mere shadow of its former self. Gone was the
Superchief, Earl Warren. Gone was Douglas, the Court's most
liberal member from 1949 to 1975,' and his old partner Black,
the "people's lawyer" from Alabama. Gone was Fortas, Doug-
las' proteg6 at Yale Law School. Of the liberal bloc that domi-
nated the 1960's, only Brennan and Marshall remained. In
contrast, the five personnel changes left the conservative wing
in a dominant position. As in the Vinson era, control rested in
the hands of a coalition of seven conservatives and moderates
led by the conservative four-vote Nixon bloc. This article will
examine the voting patterns of the Justices during the first
ten years of the Burger era, a period characterized by con-
servative dominance.
Before turning to the voting data, it may be useful to re-
call the political climate during the summer of 1969. The
1960's had witnessed the transformation of a reform move-
ment initially based upon principles of love, peace, and justice
into a ruinous state of violence and divisiveness. Shaken by
riots, bombings, and threats of violence, a "silent majority"
turned to the right and brought Richard M. Nixon into power
on a "law and order" platform in the 1968 election. Nixon, a
conservative devoted to the annihilation of the New Deal,
took office just at the crucial moment when two openings ap-
peared on the Court. Like most Presidents before him, Nixon
the Harding appointments (1921-23), the Roosevelt appointments (1937-43), the
deaths of Murphy and Rutledge (1949), and the resignations of Frankfurter and
Whittaker (1962).
4. Warren announced his resignation. President Johnson nominated Justice
Fortas to succeed Warren as Chief Justice. Opposition mounted, and Fortes un-
expectedly resigned. Nixon took office before the two vacancies could be filled.
5. Douglas joined the Court in 1939. During the first decade of his tenure, how-
ever, Justices Murphy, Rutledge, and Black had more liberal voting records at times.
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consciously sought and found jurists who agreed with his
political views."
II. THE VOTING PATTERNS DURING THE OCTOBER 1969
THROUGH 1978 TERMS
A. The October 1969 Term
At the start of the Term, the Court had a new Chief Jus-
tice, Warren E. Burger, who had taken over on the effective
date of Earl Warren's resignation, June 23, 1969. But, as a
result of delays in the selection of Fortas' successor, the
Court had only eight Justices throughout the Term.
On the basis of prior voting patterns, a 3-2-3 alignment
could be expected. Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall had been
liberals during prior Terms. Black and White had been in the
middle between the Court's liberal and conservative wings
during the immediately prior Terms. Harlan and Stewart had
been the Court's two most conservative members since 1962.
The new Chief Justice had been associated with the conserva-
tive wing of the D.C. Circuit and was selected by Nixon as a
conservative.
As expected, Burger aligned himself with the conserva-
tives during his first Term on the Court. He disagreed with
the liberals, Douglas (48.8%), Brennan (39.5%), and Marshall
(36.4%), more often than with the conservative Harlan
(17.6%) and the moderate conservative Stewart (20.0%). In
fact, Burger had the most conservative record of any Justice
during the Term.8 This can be demonstrated by comparing
Burger's voting pattern with that of Harlan, previously the
Court's most conservative member.
6. In his campaign, Nixon pledged "to nominate to the Supreme Court individ-
uals who shared my judicial philosophy, which is basically a conservative philoso-
phy." NIXON, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 1055 (1972).
7. The Senate rejected Nixon's first two nominees to fill Fortas' seat, Clement
F. Haynsworth, Jr. and G. Harrold Carswell, both of whom were conservatives from
the South.
8. See appendix A, table 1 infra.
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TABLE 1
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1969 TERM
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Harlan Burger
Douglas 41.2% 48.8%
Brennan 27.6% 39.5%
Marshall 20.8% 36.4 %
As Table 1 shows, Burger disagreed with each of the Court's
three liberals substantially more than Harlan did. For the first
time since the resignation of Frankfurter and Whittaker in
April 1962, Harlan was definitively ousted from his position as
the Court's most conservative member.'The overall voting data 0 confirm the expected alignment
of three liberals, two moderates, and three conservatives dur-
ing the Term. The liberal wing consisted of a close pair (Bren-
nan and Marshall; 6.4% disagreement rate), with Douglas a
more distant third member out on the Court's left extreme.
The conservative wing (Burger, Harlan, and Stewart) was a
rather loose coalition. Black and White were balanced be-
tween the two wings. Disagreement rates among the Justices
were relatively low. Only one pair of Justices (Douglas-Bur-
ger) had a disagreement rate (48.8%) approaching fifty per-
cent. All other disagreement rates were in the forty percent
and below range. Correspondingly, there was very little bloc
voting.
The data show a distinct swing to the right from the prior
Term." The dissent rates of the two most liberal Justices
(Douglas and Brennan) jumped, while those of the two most
conservative Justices during prior Terms (Harlan and Stew-
art) plummeted.
9. Stewart was arguably more conservative than Harlan during the October
1968 Term. See Table 2 infra.
10. See appendix A, table 1 infra.
11. In this article, "right" means conservative, and "left" means liberal. Con-
servative victories in divided decisions during the Term included: Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970) (5-3; criminal procedure; six-person jury); Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (5-2; race relations; state action); McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759 (1970) (5-3; criminal procedure; guilty plea); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970) (5-3; equal protection; welfare maximum grant restrictions); Evans v.
Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (5-2; race relations; closing of public park); Nacirema
Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969) (4-3; personal injury).
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TABLE 2
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1968 & 1969 TERMS
OCT. 1968 OCT. 1969
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Douglas 22.2% 27.9% + 5.7%
Brennan 2.0% 12.5% +10.5%
CONSERVATIVES
Stewart 33.3% 19.5% -13.8%
Harlan 32.7% 14.9% -17.8%
Although the expected swing to the right did occur, it did
not go far enough to establish conservative dominance. On the
contrary, the highest dissent rate on the Court belonged to
the most conservative Justice (Burger; 29.1%)."1 Moreover,
the Court's three most conservative members dissented more
than its three most liberal members.
TABLE 3
DISSENTS-OCTOBER 1969 TERM
JUSTICE DISSENTS DISSENT RATE
LIBERALS
Douglas 24 27.9%
Brennan 11 10.5%
Marshall 4 5.1%
Total 39
CONSERVATIVES
Stewart 17 19.5%
Harlan 13 14.9%
Burger 25 29.1%
Total 55
In fact, a number of the most famous cases of the Term were
liberal victories. 3
12. See appendix B, table 1 infra for complete data on dissent rates during the
Term.
13. E.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (5-3; criminal procedure; jury
trial); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (5-3; criminal procedure; right to coun-
sel); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (5-3; criminal procedure; proof beyond a
reasonable doubt); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (5-3; due process; right to
hearing before termination of welfare benefits); Association of Data Processing Serv.
Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (8-0; standing); Sullivan v. Little Hunting
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Black's voting record is worthy of notice. From 1937 to
1966, Black had been a member of the liberal wing. During
the October 1966, 1967, and 1968 Terms, however, he and his
old mates parted company, and he found himself in a moder-
ate position. During the October 1969 Term, Black was almost
exactly in the center between the liberal and conservative
wings.
TABLE 4
BLACK'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1969 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE
JUSTICE WITH BLACK
LIBERALS
D ouglas .................................. 35.3%
B rennan ................................. 37.9%
CONSERVATIVES
H arlan ................................... 39.5%
B urger ................................... 37.6 %
As Table 4 shows, Black disagreed with his former colleagues
in the liberal wing in more than one-third of the cases. 14
White was also balanced almost exactly in the center be-
tween the liberal and conservative wings. This can be con-
firmed by examining the following table, which shows that
White disagreed with the three liberals, in the aggregate, with
almost the same frequency as with the three conservatives.
Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (5-3; race relations; Civil Rights Act of 1866); Alexan-
der v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (8-0; race relations; school
desegregation).
14. In contrast, Black agreed with Douglas in 100% of the cases they both par-
ticipated in during the October 1938, 1939, and 1940 Terms.
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TABLE 5
DATA CONCERNING WHITE'S DISAGREEMENTS-OCTOBER 1969 TERM
DISAGREEMENTS DISAGREEMENT RATE
JUSTICE WITH WHITE WITH WHITE
LIBERALS
Douglas 30 35.3%
Brennan 16 18.4%
Marshall 12 15.4%
Total 58
CONSERVATIVES
Stewart 21 24.4%
Harlan 17 19.8%
Burger 23 27.1%
Total 61
In summary, the two personnel changes of 1969 resulted
in a substantial shift to the right. The liberal wing was re-
duced from five to three (Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall),
and the dissent rates of the liberal Justices jumped substan-
tially. The conservative wing, in contrast, grew from two to
three (Burger, Harlan, and Stewart), while the dissent rates of
Harlan and Stewart dropped substantially. Nevertheless, the
liberals retained a narrow edge in the won-lost column. Chief
Justice Burger, in his first Term, was the most conservative
member of the Court and its most frequent dissenter.
B. The October 1970 Term
On the first day of the Term, Harry A. Blackmun was
seated. Like Burger, Blackmun was chosen by President
Nixon with the expectation that he would be a judicial con-
servative. After the arrival of Blackmun, the Court was once
again at full strength, and its personnel remained unchanged
for the remainder of the Term. Joining Burger and Blackmun
on the right were Harlan, the Court's most conservative mem-
ber during the 1960's, and Stewart, the Court's second most
conservative member during the 1960's. For the first time in
years, the conservative wing was larger than the liberal wing,
which was now reduced to three (Douglas, Brennan, and
Marshall).
Blackmun immediately joined Burger on the Court's far
right. Blackmun and Burger disagreed in only 4.7% of the
1981]
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cases (5 out of 106). This was by far the lowest disagreement
rate between any two Justices on the Court, and it earned
them the nickname "Minnesota Twins.' 1 5 Blackmun's voting
record during the Term was the most conservative on the en-
tire Court. Overall, he disagreed with the three liberals more
frequently than either Burger or Harlan did, as the following
table shows.
TABLE 6
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1970 TERM
Harlan Burger Blackmun
DOUGLAS 46.6% 52.4% 53.9%
BRENNAN 38.3% 42.1% 41.5%
MARSHALL 29.9% 38.7% 40.0%
The swing to the right, which had begun during the prior
Term, accelerated. The dissent rates of the three liberal Jus-
tices jumped dramatically; Marshall's dissent rate quintupled,
Brennan's rate doubled, and Douglas' rate (41.3%) was his
highest since the October 1953 Term. In contrast, the con-
servative Burger dissented less than half as often as during
the prior Term.' His dissent rate (13.0%) was less than a
third of Douglas'. The following table contains data illustrat-
ing these trends.
TABLE 7
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1968, 1969 & 1970 TERMS
OCT. 1968 OCT. 1969 OCT. 1970
JUSTICE TERM TERM TERM CHANGE
Douglas 22.2% 27.9% 41.3% +19.1%
Brennan 2.0% 12.5% 29.6% +27.6%
Marshall 6.7% 5.1% 27.1% +20.4%
Burger 29.1% 13.0% -16.1%
In contrast to the prior Term, when the liberals retained
a slight advantage, the October 1970 Term witnessed a clear
15. Both are from St. Paul, Minnesota.
16. The extent of the Court's swing to the right is strikingly apparent from the
fact that Burger had the highest dissent rate on the Court during the October 1969
Term and the lowest dissent rate on the Court during the October 1970 Term.
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conservative edge." The dissent rate of the three liberals were
higher than those of the three conservatives. Not since the
October 1953 Term had the liberals performed so poorly in
comparison to the conservatives in the won-lost figures.
TABLE 8
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1970 TERM
JUSTICE DISSENT RATE
LIBERALS
D ouglas ...................................... 41.3 %
B rennan ..................................... 29.6%
M arshall ..................................... 27.1%
CONSERVATIVES
W h ite .............. ............. ......... 16.8 %
B urger ....................................... 13.0 %
B lackm un .................................... 16.8%
The shift in the balance of power to the conservative side
was reflected in the voting patterns of Stewart and White.
Both were much closer to the conservatives than to the liber-
als. Although not as conservative as Blackmun and Burger,
Stewart and White were at least as conservative as Harlan.
Their low disagreement rates with the Nixon appointees were
a telltale sign of the Court's rightward shift.
17. Important conservative victories during the Term included: Abate v.
Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971) (7-2; legislative apportionment); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124 (1971) (6-3; legislative apportionment); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(1971) (6-3; due process; social security); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971)
(6-3; criminal procedure; death penalty); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) (5-4;
loss of citizenship); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (5-4; criminal procedure;
Miranda); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S.
154 (1971) (5-4; attorney oath); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (8-1; absten-
tion); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (5-4; welfare; home visits).
On the other hand, some significant liberal decisions were issued during the Oc-
tober 1970 Term. E.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (6-
3; free speech; Pentagon Papers); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (5-
4; criminal procedure; search and seizure); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (6-3; damage suits for civil rights violations); Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (9-0; welfare rights of nonresident aliens); Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (5-4; free speech; "Fuck the Draft" jacket); Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (9-0; school desegregation); UTU v.
State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971) (5-3; attorney solicitation); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971); (8-0; race relations; employment discrimination); Tate v. Short,
401 U.S. 395 (1971) (9-0; criminal procedure; equal protection); Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (8-1; due process); Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (5-4;
admission to practice law; inquiry into Communist affiliations).
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TABLE 9
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1970 TERM
[Vol. 21
Stewart White
LIBERALS
Douglas 49.5% 46.1%
Brennan 34.6% 31.1%
Marshall 32.1% 34.9%
CONSERVATIVES
Harlan 23.6% 28.0%
Burger 18.7% 15.1%
Blackmun 19.8% 15.2%
This was the last Term for two of the Court's giants,
Harlan and Black. Harlan, a conservative, maintained his
usual high disagreement rate with Douglas (46.6%), but was
otherwise surprisingly moderate. Black's last Term was
marked by a continuation of his swing to the right. He dis-
agreed with the two Nixon appointees less than with his
former colleagues in the liberal wing.
TABLE 10
DATA CONCERNING BLACK'S DISAGREEMENTS-OCTOBER 1970 TERM
DISAGREEMENTS DISAGREEMENT RATEJUSTICE WITH BLACK WITH BLACK
LIBERALS
Douglas 36 35.0%
Brennan 36 33.6%
Marshall 38 35.8%
CONSERVATIVES
Burger 27 25.2%
Blackmun 31 29.0%
To summarize, the October 1970 Term saw the balance of
power shift to the conservatives. Blackmun, in his first Term,
occupied the far right in close partnership with Burger. White
moved substantially to the right into the third most conserva-
tive position. Harlan and Stewart continued their basically
conservative voting patterns. Even Black leaned to the right.
This left Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall in minority status
on the liberal wing. The dissent rates of the liberals jumped
dramatically to levels substantially higher than the conserva-
tives. The conservative dominance that characterized the first
THE BURGER COURT
decade of the Burger era had begun.
C. The October 1971 Term
When the October 1971 Term opened, there were two va-
cant seats on the Court. During the recess Hugo L. Black and
John M. Harlan had resigned because of illness. The two seats
remained open until January 7, 1972. Thus the Court sat for
three months with only seven Justices. On the basis of past
performance, the expected alignment was three liberals
(Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall), one moderate (White), one
moderate conservative (Stewart), and two conservatives (Bur-
ger and Blackmun).
To replace Black and Harlan, President Nixon appointed
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist. With the seat-
ing of Powell and Rehnquist, the "Nixon Court" was com-
pleted, and the Court entered a period of nearly four years in
which there were no personnel changes. Although the two new
Justices did not sit during the first part of the Term, they did
participate in roughly half of the decisions, providing suffi-
cient data to allow generalizations concerning their voting
patterns.
Like Burger during the October 1969 Term and Black-
mun during the October 1970 Term, Rehnquist and Powell
promptly lined up on the far right of the Court. Indeed, they
both voted at least as conservatively as Burger and Blackmun.
This can be deduced from the data in the following table.
TABLE 11
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1971 TERM
Blackmun Burger Powell Rehnquist
Douglas 57.9% 60.9% 58.1% 61.5%
Brennan 42.4% 47.2% 50.8% 48.5%
Marshall 39.4% 44.2% 54.0% 53.0%
In their first Term together on the Court, the four Nixon
appointees comprised a solid conservative bloc. The cohesion
among the four was quite high, as the following table shows.
19811
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TABLE 12
AGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1971 TERM
[Vol. 21
Blackmun Burger Powell Rehnquist
Blackmun 89.0% 80.3% 87.5%
Burger 92.1% 90.9%
Powell 88.3%
Rehnquist
The balance of power during the Term rested with the
conservatives.' 8 The dissent rates of the Court's three liberal
Justices were substantially higher than the dissent rates of the
four conservatives, as the following table shows.
18. Important conservative victories during the Term included: Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1971) (5-4; free press); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972) (5-3; due process); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (5-4; domestic surveil-
lance); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (5-4; free speech; access); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (6-3; race relations; private clubs); Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (5-4; criminal procedure; counsel at lineup); Jefferson
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (5-4; equal protection; intent to discriminate);
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (5-4; criminal procedure; jury trial); Johnson
v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (5-4; criminal procedure; jury trial); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (5-2; due process; landlord-tenant).
There were also some liberal victories during the October 1971 Term. E.g.,
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (5-4; criminal procedure; death penalty);
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972) (5-4; criminal procedure; grand jury);
Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (5-4; race relations; school desegre-
gation); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (8-0; elec-
tronic surveillance); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (4-3; due process); Lynch v.
Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (4-3; due process); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (6-1; equal protection; contraceptives).
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TABLE 13
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1971 TERM
JUSTICE DISSENT RATE
LIBERALS
D ouglas ...................................... 43.8%
B rennan ..................................... 31.5 %
M arshall ..................................... 25.6 %
CONSERVATIVES
B lackm un .................................... 16.5%
B urger ....................................... 18.6 %
P ow ell ....................................... 19.0 %
R ehnquist .................................... 16.7%
The conservative dominance can be illustrated by exam-
ining the behavior of the Court's most liberal member, Doug-
las. His dissent rate continued its upward climb: 22.2% (Octo-
ber 1968 Term), 27.9% (October 1969 Term), 41.3% (October
1970 Term), 43.8% (October 1971 Term). Douglas' 43.8% dis-
sent rate was the highest of any Justice since the start of the
Warren era. The extreme distance of Douglas from the main-
stream of the Court's decisions is reflected in his extraordi-
narily high disagreement rates with each of the members of
the dominant conservative bloc: 61.5% (Douglas-Rehnquist),
60.9% (Douglas-Burger), 58.1% (Douglas-Powell), 57.9%
(Douglas-Blackmun).
An interesting change occurred in the voting patterns of
the Court's two remaining members, Stewart and White.
Throughout the Warren Court's final period of liberal domi-
nance (1962-1969), Stewart had been a moderate conservative,
leaning more toward Harlan's position than toward that of the
liberals. During the same period, White was a moderate, often
very near the center, frequently a little to the right, and occa-
sionally a little to the left. Stewart's composite voting record
was consistently more conservative than White's during this
period. But during the October 1971 Term, the two Justices
reversed their positions. White's voting record was distinctly
more conservative than Stewart's; he disagreed with each of
the liberals more frequently and with each of the conserva-
tives less frequently than Stewart did.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
TABLE 14
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1971 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE DISAGREEMENT RATE
JUSTICE WITH STEWART WITH WHITE
LIBERALS
Douglas 35.7% 46.1%
Brennan 24.8% 29.1%
Marshall 18.9% 31.0%
CONSERVATIVES
Blackmun 27.2% 15.7%
Burger 29.9% 22.5%
Powell 31.7% 28.6%
Rehnquist 32.3% 24.2%
In spite of their change in relative position, Stewart and
White were unquestionably the Court's moderates. Their vot-
ing records placed them between the three-vote liberal and
four-vote conservative blocs.19
In summary the October 1971 Term was dominated by a
four-vote conservative bloc composed entirely of Nixon ap-
pointees. The five remaining survivors of the Warren era were
scattered across a moderate to liberal spectrum. The three-
vote liberal wing had the highest dissent rates, with Douglas,
the Court's most liberal member, disagreeing with each of the
four conservatives in roughly six out of every ten cases.
Within less than three years, the Court had changed from a 6-
2-1 or 5-3-1 liberal majority to a 4-2-3 conservative plurality,
marking one of the most dramatic short-term shifts in orien-
tation in the entire history of the Supreme Court.
D. The October 1972 Term
This was the first full Term for the "Nixon Court" and
the first of three full Terms with stable personnel. The lineup
on the Court was the most conservative it had been since at
least 1956 and arguably since before the constitutional revolu-
tion of 1937. The nation was also in a conservative mood. At
the start of the Term, the presidential campaign was in full
swing. The 1972 election offered the nation a choice between
the conservative incumbent Richard M. Nixon and the liberal
19. See appendix A, table 3 infra, which contains complete data on disagree-
ment rates during the October 1971 Term.
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challenger George McGovern. The November election pro-
duced a landslide for Nixon, whose campaign stressed "law
and order," the rights of the "silent majority," and the dis-
mantling of the welfare state.
Voting data for the Term suggest the existence of a five-
vote conservative bloc.20 As expected, the four Nixon appoin-
tees had conservative voting patterns. Rehnquist occupied the
far right, moving Burger into the second most conservative
position. Blackmun and Powell were also definitely conserva-
tive, although Powell shifted toward a more moderate posture
than in the prior Term. Somewhat surprisingly, White moved
far to the right into the heart of the conservative bloc, as the
following table shows.
TABLE 15
WHITE'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1972 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE
JUSTICE WITH WHITE
LIBERALS
D ouglas .................................. 57.2%
B rennan ................................. 42.9%
M arshall ................................. 40.6%
CONSERVATIVES
P ow ell ................................... 20.8%
B lackm un ................................ 17.6%
B urger ................................... 19.6 %
R ehnquist ................................ 19.7%
White's swing to the right continued the trend of the prior
Term, when he moved to the right of Stewart after a long his-
tory as the Court's most centralist member.
In contrast to White, Stewart remained almost exactly in
the center between the liberal and conservative wings. As the
following table shows, his disagreement rates with the three
most conservative Justices were only slightly lower than with
the three liberals.
20. See appendix A, table 4 infra. Cohesion was not as high among the conserv-
atives as during the prior Term.
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TABLE 16
STEWART'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1972 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE
JUSTICE WITH STEWART
LIBERALS
D ouglas .................................. 40.3%
B rennan ................................. 36.6%
M arshall ................................. 34.9%
A verage ................................ 37.3%
CONSERVATIVES
W hite ................................... 38.6 %
B urger ....................... ........... 33.6 %
R ehnquist ................................ 38.3%
A verage ................................ 36.8%
Predictably, the conservative wing dominated the Court
and controlled its decisions." With the exception of Rehn-
quist, the conservatives' dissent rates were quite low. The dis-
sent rates of Burger, Blackmun, and Powell were substantially
lower than during the prior Term. The dissent rates of the
three liberals, in contrast, climbed to new highs and reached
levels far above those of the conservatives.
21. Important conservative victories during the Term included: United States v.
Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (6-3; criminal procedure; counsel at identification proce-
dure); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (5-4; free speech; obscen-
ity); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (5-4; free speech; obscenity); Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (5-4; violation of civil rights); White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755 (1973) (6-3; legislative apportionment); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)
(6-3; legislative apportionment); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (6-3;
criminal procedure; consent searches); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (5-3;
freedom of religion); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (5-
4; equal protection; financing of public schools); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Ba-
sin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (6-3; equal protection; voting rights);
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (5-4; equal protection; filing fees); Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (5-3; legislative apportionment); United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973) (5-4; equal protection; filing fees); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322 (1972) (7-2; criminal procedure; self-incrimination).
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TABLE 17
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1971 & 1972 TERMS
OCT. 1971 OCT. 1972
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Douglas 43.8% 50.7% +6.9%
Brennan 31.5% 34.8% +3.3%
Marshall 25.6% 32.6% +7.0%
CONSERVATIVES
Powell 19.0% 10.6% -8.4%
Blackmun 16.5% 8.7% -7.8%
Burger 18.6% 13.6% -5.0%
The dissent rates of all three liberals continued the rapid
upward trend of prior Terms. Each of the three achieved a
new personal record, and Douglas' dissent rate (50.7%) was
the highest since the February 1795 Term.22 The continued
collapse of the liberal bloc can be illustrated in many ways.
The following table, for example, compares the liberals' dis-
sent rates during the October 1968 and 1972 Terms.
TABLE 18
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1968 & 1972 TERMS
OCT. 1968 OCT. 1972
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
Douglas 18.3% 50.7% + 32.4%
Brennan 2.0% 34.8% +32.8%
Marshall 6.7% 32.6% +26.9%
The three liberals accounted for nearly 60% of the Court's
total dissents during the Term.2"
22. The previous record, also held by Douglas, was 50.0% in the October 1952
Term. This conclusion is based on studies of dissent rates undertaken by the author.
23. Complete data on dissents during the October 1972 Term are set forth in
appendix B, table 4 infra. There were some important liberal victories during the
Term. E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (6-3; freedom
of religion); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (7-2; equal protection; aliens);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (8-1; equal protection; aliens); USDA v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (7-2; equal protecton; welfare); USDA v. Murry, 413 U.S.
508 (1973) (5-4; equal protection; welfare); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189
(1973) (6-2; race relations; school desegregation); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S.
669 (1973) (5-3; standing); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (8-1; equal
protection; sex discrimination); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (7-2; abortion);
Traflicante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (9-0; standing).
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Polarization between the Court's extremes remained very
high. The disagreement rate between Douglas and Rehnquist(66.2%) was a modern Supreme Court record. Seven pairs of
Justices had disagreement rates above 50%. Notably, Douglas
disagreed with each of the five conservatives in more than
50% of the cases.
TABLE 19
DISAGREEMENT RATES ABOVE 50%-OCTOBER 1972 TERM
Powell Blackmun White Burger Rehnquist
Douglas 51.5% 54.3% 57.2% 57.9% 66.2%
Brennan 58.2%
Marshall 55.2%
There was frequent bloc voting. In thirty-two cases, the entire
liberal wing (Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall) dissented. Re-
flecting the high degree of polarization, the average number of
dissents per case (2.16) was the highest of the Burger Court's
first decade and one of the highest in the history of the Court.
In summary, voting data for the October 1972 Term sug-
gest an alignment of five conservatives, one moderate, and
three liberals. The conservatives exercised almost complete
control and, except for Rehnquist, dissented infrequently. The
dissent rates of the three liberals jumped to record levels. It
was an extremely strong Term for the conservatives.
E. The October 1973 Term24
The 1973 Term was dominated by the same six-vote coa-
lition of conservatives and moderate conservatives that had
dominated the prior Term. On the far right, once again, was
Rehnquist. He disagreed with each of the three liberals more
frequently than any other Justice did. Noteworthy was his
62.7% disagreement rate with Douglas (84 disagreements in
134 cases). As in the prior Term, Burger was the second most
conservative Justice. Blackmun and Powell had the third and
fourth most conservative voting patterns. The cohesion of this
four-vote conservative bloc and its distance from the three
liberals are shown in the following table.
24. There were no personnel changes during the Term.
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TABLE 20
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1973 TERM
Powell Blackmun Burger Rehnquist
LIBERALS
Douglas 50.4% 51.5% 55.9% 62.7%
Brennan 41.4% 42.8% 41.1% 53.6%
Marshall 40.2% 42.6% 47.1% 51.5%
CONSERVATIVES
Powell 18.8% 14.3% 14.5%
Blackmun - 10.9% 14.7%
Burger 9.4%
Rehnquist
Identifiable shifts occurred in the voting patterns of the
Court's two moderate conservatives, White and Stewart. After
two terms of increasing conservatism, White moved back to-
ward a more moderate voting posture. His disagreement rates
with the liberals were substantially lower than those of the
four Nixon appointees and also substantially lower than in the
prior Term. White did not, however, move all the way back to
the center; he remained more closely aligned with the conserv-
atives. Meanwhile Stewart moved substantially to the right.
During the prior Term, he had been very near the center.
During the October 1973 Term, he resumed his more accus-
tomed place substantially to the right of center. Indeed, he
moved to the right of White.
The six-vote conservative coalition controlled the out-
come of the vast bulk of cases decided during the Term.25 The
25. Important conservative victories involving three or more dissents by the lib-
erals and moderates included the following cases: Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I),
418 U.S. 717 (1974) (5-4; race relations; school desegregation); Schlesinger v. Reserv-
ists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (6-3; standing); United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (5-4; standing); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)
(6-3; criminal procedure; equal protection); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (6-
3; equal protection; sex discrimination); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974) (6-3; civil procedure; class actions); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974) (5-4; due process); California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (6-3;
privacy; constitutionality of Bank Secrecy Act of 1970); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974) (5-4; retroactive welfare benefits); Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational
Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974) (5-4; race relations; appointment of public offi-
cials); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (6-3; race relations; case or contro-
versy); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (6-3; civil procedure;
class actions); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (6-3; criminal proce-
dure; search incident to arrest).
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dissent rates of Rehnquist and Stewart dropped substantially,
while those of the other four conservatives hovered near the
low levels of the prior Term.
TABLE 21
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1973 TERM
CHANGE FROMJUSTICE RATE PRIOR TERM
White 13.6% + 0.6%
Stewart 11.9% 
-15.7%
Powell 9.8% 
- 0.8%
Blackmun 10.1% + 1.4%
Burger 12.1% 
- 1.5%
Rehnquist 15.9% 
- 8.6%
The liberals, in contrast, dissented frequently. The dis-
sent rates of Brennan and Marshall continued their upward
trend to personal record highs. Douglas, the Court's most lib-
eral member, dissented somewhat less frequently than in the
prior Term when he set the modern Court record, but he still
dissented more than any other Justice. In fact, Douglas dis-
sented more than Stewart, Powell, Blackmun, and Burger
combined. The three liberals cast nearly two-thirds of all the
dissents during the Term.
TABLE 22
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1972 & 1973 TERMS
JUSTICE OCT. 1972 OCT. 1973
Douglas 50.7% 45.6%
Brennan 34.8% 37.1%
Marshall 32.6% 35.5%
The liberal wing included the very close Brennan-Marshall
pair and Douglas, aligned somewhat by himself on the left
extreme."8
26. The liberal wing also won several divided cases during the Term. E.g.,Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974) (5-4; criminal contempt); National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (6-3; free speech; defamation);
Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 417 U.S. 790 (1974) (5-4; labor); Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (5-3; equal pay); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S.802 (1974) (5-3; labor); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (5-4; criminal
procedure; electronic surveillance); Super Tire Eng'r Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115
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To summarize, the October 1973 Term was another very
strong Term for the conservatives. A six-vote coalition of con-
servatives and moderate conservatives controlled the Court.
The core of the conservative majority was a cohesive four-vote
bloc composed of Rehnquist, Burger, Blackmun, and Powell.
They were joined in most cases by White and Stewart, whose
voting patterns had become quite similar after a shift to the
left by White and a shift to the right by Stewart. A three-vote
liberal bloc (Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall) dissented fre-
quently. This was the fourth consecutive Term of conservative
dominance.
F. The October 1974 Term
For the third consecutive Term no changes in personnel
occurred. The voting alignment that characterized the prior
Term continued. A six-vote coalition of conservatives and
moderate conservatives dominated the Court. On the right
were the four Nixonians, Rehnquist, Burger, Powell, and
Blackmun. Stewart and White were between the extremes and
sided with the conservatives more than with the liberals.
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall held down the left wing and
dissented more often than the other six Justices combined.
Let us consider, first, the dominant conservative wing.
Rehnquist, as usual, had the most conservative voting record.
Burger, as usual, lined up near Rehnquist on the right. Powell
also had a strongly conservative voting pattern. He was close
to Burger; their 12.2% disagreement rate was the second low-
est on the Court.
Blackmun had a somewhat more moderate voting pat-
tern. In general he disagreed with the liberals less than the
other conservatives did. Blackmun's disagreement record with
the liberals was very similar to those of Stewart and White. As
a result, it may be valid to consider Blackmun a moderate
conservative during the Term rather than a core conservative.
White was also distinctly more moderate than the three
core conservatives. This suggests, once again, that his swing to
the right during the October 1971 and 1972 Terms was
(1974) (5-4; labor); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (6-3; free speech); Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974) (6-3; equal protection; welfare); Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (6-3; free speech); Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414
U.S. 573 (1974) (5-4; maritime personal injury).
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temporary.
The dissent rates of the dominant conservative wing re-
mained in the low range that characterized prior Terms. They
controlled the Court and had little to complain about.'
TABLE 23
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1974 TERM
JUSTICE DISSENT RATE
S tew art ........................................ 17.1%
W hite ................. ........ .......... 11.4 %
B lackm un ....................... ............ 8.1%
P ow ell ....................... 
................. 11.3%
B urger ............... 
................. 
..... 13.0 %
R ehnquist ..................................... 18.7%
The only major change in the voting pattern of the
Court's relatively isolated three-vote liberal wing was a sub-
stantial drop in dissent rates. Douglas' dissent rate edged
down for the second straight Term, and both Brennan's and
Marshall's dropped by nearly one-third from their personal
record highs of the prior Term.
TABLE 24
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1974 TERM
JUSTICE DISSENT RATE CHANGE FROM
Douglas 44.9% 
- 0.7%
Brennan 28.7% 
- 8.4%
Marshall 24.4% 
- 10.9%
Had the liberals become resigned to the conservative trends of
the majority? Were the cases the liberals cared about not get-
ting the four votes needed for review? Whatever the reason,
27. The conservatives prevailed over dissents by the liberals in the following
cases: Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (6-3; irrebuttable presumptions; SocialSecurity benefits); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (5-4; standing); Hicks v. Mi-
randa, 422 U.S. 332 (1975) (5-4; abstention); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (5-2; attorneys' fees); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)(6-2; criminal procedure; Miranda); Hoffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (6-3; abstention); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (5-4; equal protection; sexdiscrimination); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (6-3; residency requirement);
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (6-3; due process; state ac-
tion); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974) (6-3; criminal procedure; pardons).
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the new pattern reversed a rather long trend toward higher
dissent rates in the liberal wing.
TABLE 25
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1968 THROUGH 1974 TERMS
OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT. OCT..
JUSTICE 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Douglas 18.3% 27.9% 41.3% 43.8% 50.7% 45.6% 44.9%
Brennan 8.7% 12.5% 29.6% 31.5% 34.8% 37.1% 28.7%
Marshall 6.7% 5.1% 27.1% 25.6% 32.6% 35.5% 24.4%
In spite of their reduced dissent rates, the liberals were still
far above the conservatives when it came to dissent rates. The
combined dissents of the three liberals (113) were more than
those of all the remaining six Justices (97).2S
This was Douglas' final Term. Although he did not resign
until the following Term, he participated in only one decision
after the October 1974 Term. Long the champion of the lib-
eral cause, Douglas ended the longest tenure in the history of
the Court in his accustomed place on the far left. Dissenter to
the last, he disagreed with each of the six members of the con-
servative wing more than either Brennan or Marshall did.
Court watchers have speculated, in light of Douglas' dissent in
DeFunis v. Odigaard,9 that he, like Black, moved to the right
at the end of his career. However, the voting data show that
while Douglas' liberalism softened somewhat during his last
two Terms, he did not, like Black, move from the Court's ex-
treme left to the center. To the end, Douglas was the Court's
"most liberal Justice."
In summary, the October 1974 Term was the fifth consec-
utive Term of conservative dominance. The Court was con-
trolled by a six-vote conservative wing composed of three core
conservatives (Rehnquist, Burger, and Powell) and three mod-
28. Liberal victories in divided cases included: Herring v. New York, 422 U.S.
853 (1975) (6-3; criminal procedure; right to closing argument); Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806 (1975) (6-3; criminal procedure; right to appear in pro per); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (5-4; civil rights; immunity); United States v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 (1975) (5-4; antitrust); North Ga. Finishing Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (6-3; due process; debtor-creditor); Goss v. Lo-
pez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (5-4; due process; students' rights).
29. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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erate conservatives (Blackmun, White, and Stewart). The
three liberals (Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall), as a distinct
minority, accounted for more than half of the dissents.
G. The October 1975 Term
The Court's personnel underwent another face lift during
the Term with the retirement of William 0. Douglas. To re-
place Douglas, President Ford appointed John Paul Stevens.
Since Douglas participated in only one decision and Stevens
participated in roughly half the decisions, the Court had only
eight members in nearly half the cases.
Once again, the Term was totally dominated by the six-
vote bloc of conservatives and moderate conservatives. This
can be readily deduced from the fact that Brennan and Mar-
shall, the two remaining liberals, cast almost as many dissent-
ing votes (100) as all six members of the conservative wing(105).10 The dissent rates of the conservatives remained at the
very low levels that had characterized prior Terms.
30. Important conservative victories over dissents by Brennan and Marshall in-
cluded: Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (6-3; criminal procedure; habeas corpus);
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (5-4; criminal procedure; search and
seizure); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (7-2; criminal procedure; death pen-
alty); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (6-3; equal protection; illegitimates);
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (7-2; criminal procedure; search and
seizure); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (6-2; race relations;
school desegregation); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (5-
4; free speech; zoning); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (6-3; pendant jurisdic-
tion); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (5-4; commerce clause;
states' rights); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (7-2; race relations; intent to
discriminate); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (7-2; criminal procedure;
search and seizure); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (6-2; police hair length
regulation); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (6-2; free speech; access); Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (5-3; due process); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976)(6-2; free speech; access); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (5-3; free
speech; defamation); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (6-2; due process);
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (6-2; criminal procedure; search and
seizure); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (5-3; case or controversy); Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1976) (6-2; criminal procedure; Miranda).
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TABLE 26
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1975 TERM
CHANGE FROM
JUSTICE DISSENT RATE PRIOR TERM
Blackmun 13.0% + 1.6%
Powell 4.4% -6.9%
Burger 9.4% -3.6%
Rehnquist 20.3% + 1.6%
Powell's 4.4% dissent rate was the lowest of any Justice since
the October 1968 Term.
The dissent rates of the two liberals, in contrast, turned
sharply upward again after their sudden drop during the prior
Term."1 Brennan's dissent rate (38.4%) was a personal record
high.
TABLE 27
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1975 TERM
CHANGE FROM
JUSTICE DISSENT RATE PRIOR TERM
Brennan 38.4% + 9.7%
Marshall 34.8% +10.4%
The alignment within the conservative wing was similar
to that during the prior Term. Rehnquist was on the far right
with Burger next to him. Their distance from Brennan and
Marshall is shown in the following table.
31. The few liberal victories in divided cases included: Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (5-4; criminal procedure; capital punishment); Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (5-4; standing); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976) (5-4; right of privacy; abortion); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (5-3;
freedom of association); Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (5-4; due process;
aliens); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (5-3; race relations; em-
ployment discrimination).
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TABLE 28
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1975 TERM
Brennan Marshall Burger Rehnquist
LIBERALS
Brennan 5.9% 47.8% 58.7%
Marshall 44.4% 55.6%
CONSERVATIVES
Burger 10.9%
Rehnquist
The split was not as extreme as during several prior Terms
when disagreement rates above 60% were common, but it was
still very high.
Blackmun and Powell had basically conservative voting
records. Blackmun disagreed with the liberals a little more
than Powell did, but he also disagreed with Rehnquist and
Burger a little more, so no clear choice can be made as to who
was more conservative. Powell was, once again, very closely
aligned with Burger.
Stewart and White were aligned somewhat to the left ofBlackmun and Powell. Stewart disagreed with both the liber-
als and the conservatives a little more than White did, so their
relative alignment is also quite arbitrary.
TABLE 29
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1975 TERM
Stewart White
LIBERALS
Brennan 40.9% 37.0%
Marshall 37.3% 34.8%
CONSERVATIVES
Burger 24.8% 15.2%
Rehnquist 25.5% 23.2%
As Table 29 shows, both White and Stewart leaned definitely
to the right rather than to the left.
Stevens, who was seated in December 1975, participated
in seventy-two of the one hundred thirty-eight decisions. As
the following table shows, he was located quite near the center
with a slight inclination to the right.
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TABLE 30
STEVENS' DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1975 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE
JUSTICE WITH STEVENS
LIBERALS
B rennan ................................. 36.1%
M arshall ................................. 38.6%
CONSERVATIVES
B urger ................................... 31.9 %
R ehnquist .... ........................... 33.3%
Overall, Stevens' record was the third most liberal on the
Court.
To summarize, the Court's alignment during the October
1975 Term was two liberals and six conservatives and moder-
ate conservatives, with the newly seated Stevens near the
center between the two extremes. For the sixth consecutive
Term, there was clear conservative dominance. The fortunes
of the liberals sank to a new low with the loss of the liberal
champion, William 0. Douglas, at a time when his long time
opponent, Gerald Ford, was in a positon to select his replace-
ment. It was a vintage year for the conservative Burger Court.
H. The October 1976 Term
This was Stevens' first full Term on the Court. Analysis
of prior Terms has revealed fairly consistent patterns among
the other eight Justices. The right wing had been occupied by
the four core conservatives, Rehnquist, Burger, Powell, and
Blackmun. Of the four, only Powell and Blackmun had shown
even occasional tendencies toward a moderate position. The
liberal wing, after the resignation of Douglas, was down to two
members, Brennan and Marshall. The remaining two Justices,
Stewart and White, had been moderate conservatives with oc-
casional recent deviations to the left by Stewart and to the
right by White. The alignments of these eight Justices re-
mained unchanged during the October 1976 Term.
The following table shows the disagreement rates be-
tween the Court's liberal and conservative wings.
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TABLE 31
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1976 TERM
Blackmun Powell Burger Rehnquist
Brennan 40.0% 41.9% 52.0% 58.2%
Marshall 39.8% 41.8% 52.0% 56.5%
Clearly Rehnquist was again on the far right; he disagreed
with both the liberals substantially more frequently than his
conservative colleagues did. Just as plainly, Burger held the
second most conservative position. The relative placement of
Powell and Blackmun is less clear, but both were more moder-
ate than Rehnquist and Burger.
White and Stewart, the Court's moderate conservatives,
also voted in a manner consistent with prior patterns. Their
disagreement rates with the liberals were lower than those of
the four core conservatives, but they leaned to the right rather
than the left.
TABLE 32
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1976 TERM
White Stewart
LIBERALS
Brennan 38.1% 40.3%
Marshall 34.7% 36.9%
CONSERVATIVES
Powell 17.6% 25.2%
Blackmun 20.2% 20.3%
Burger 20.8% 23.6%
Rehnquist 28.2% 21.3%
How did Stevens vote during his first full Term on the
Court? The answer can be derived from the following table.
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TABLE 33
STEVENS' DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1976 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE
JUSTICE WITH STEVENS
LIBERALS
B rennan ................................. 28.5%
M arshall ................................. 28.9%
CONSERVATIVES
B urger ................................... 36.1%
R ehnquist ................................ 40.2%
Stevens was clearly left of center. He agreed with the liberals
more than with the conservatives. He was a moderate liberal,
the Court's third most liberal member.
Dissent and disagreement rates were rather high. On the
liberal wing, the dissent rates remained at or near record
levels for both Brennan and Marshall. Of greater interest,
however, is the fact that the dissent rates of the Court's three
most conservative members increased. Evidently the conserv-
atives had some new ground for discontent in the trend of
Court decisions.
32. Important liberal victories in divided cases included: Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977) (6-3; criminal procedure; capital punishment); Nixon v. Administrator
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (7-2; presidential papers); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350 (1977) (5-4; free speech; attorney solicitation); United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1 (1977) (7-2; criminal procedure; search and seizure); Nyquist v. Mauclet,
432 U.S. 1 (1977) (5-4; equal protection; aliens); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977) (7-2; right of privacy; contraceptives); Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (5-4; right of privacy; family living arrangements); Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (6-3; criminal procedure; prisoners' rights); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (6-3; free speech; "Live Free or Die" license plates);
Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (5-4; criminal procedure; jury discrimina-
tion); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (5-4; criminal procedure; right to coun-
sel); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (5-4; equal protection; sex discrimina-
tion); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (7-2; equal protection; sex discrimination).
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TABLE 34
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1975 & 1976 TERMS
OCT. 1975 OCT. 1976
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
Powell 4.4% 10.5% +6.1%
Burger 9.4% 16.8% +7.4%
Rehnquist 20.3% 21.8% +1.5%
In spite of the higher dissent rate on the right, the Term
was characterized by continuing conservative dominance. This
is clear when one considers that the two liberals cast more
total dissents than all four core conservatives.3
TABLE 35
DISSENTS-OCTOBER 1976 TERM
JUSTICE DISSENTS
LIBERALS
B ren nan .......................................... 47
M arshall .......................................... 44
T o ta l . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1
CONSERVATIVES
P ow ell ................ ................ .. ... ....... 13
B lackm un ......................................... 13
B urger ............................................ 21
R ehnquist ......................................... 24
T otal ................ .... ....................... 7 1
To recapitulate, the voting alignment during the October
1976 Term was two liberals, three moderates, and four con-
servatives. Stevens, in his first full Term, was moderately lib-
33. Important conservative victories over dissents by Brennan and Marshall in-
cluded: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (5-4; free
press; right of privacy); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (6-3; right of privacy; abor-
tions); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (5-4; abstention); United Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (7-2; race relations; employment dis-
crimination); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (4-3; contract
clause); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (5-4; due process; school discipline);
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (6-3; abstention); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S.
545 (1977) (7-2; criminal procedure; right to counsel); United States v. Donovan, 429
U.S. 413 (1977) (6-3; criminal procedure; electronic surveillance); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (5-3; equal protec-
tion; racial discrimination; intent to discriminate).
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eral. White and Stewart, however, leaned to the right, giving
the balance of power to the conservative wing. Once again, the
liberals (Brennan and Marshall) dissented much more fre-
quently than the conservatives. The Court was highly po-
larized; dissent rates remained high. It was a Term character-
ized by conservative dominance, but with a trend toward a
more moderate 2-5-2 alignment.
I. The October 1977 Term
No changes in personnel occurred during the Term. Yet,
a number of interesting changes emerged in the voting pat-
terns of the Justices. 4 To set the stage, let us examine the
behavior of the pairs of Justices who occupied the Court's
right and left extremes. The two most conservative Justices,
for the sixth consecutive Term, were Rehnquist and Burger
respectively. The two most liberal Justices, for the third con-
secutive Term, were Brennan and Marshall. Data concerning
the alignment of these four Justices are presented in the
following table.
TABLE 36
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1977 TERM
Brennan Marshall Burger Rehnquist
LIBERALS
Brennan 7.5% 54.6% 58.3%
Marshall 45.7% 53.5%
CONSERVATIVES
Burger 21.7%
Rehnquist
While these alignments are similar to prior Terms, new devel-
opments occurred in the distribution of the remaining five jus-
tices between the two extremes.
White moved to the left of center for the first time since
the October 1963 Term. Admittedly his inclination to the left
was slight, as Table 37 shows, but the movement toward the
Brennan-Marshall pole was striking when compared with
prior Terms, such as the October 1972 Term, when he was
deep in the heart of the conservative wing.
34. Because the voting patterns are different from other Terms, the discussion
is a little more detailed.
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TABLE 37
WHITE'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1972 & 1977 TERMS
OCT. 1972 OCT. 1977
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Brennan 42.9% 31.5% 
-11.4%
Marshall 40.6% 29.9% 
-10.7%
CONSERVATIVES
Burger 19.6% 34.9% +15.3%
Rehnquist 19.7% 40.3% + 20.6%
Overall, White was the third most liberal Justice during the
October 1977 Term.
Stewart moved to the left to a position almost exactly in
the center between the Court's poles. Table 38 compares
Stewart's alignment in the October 1977 Term and the prior
Term, when he was closer to the Rehnquist-Burger pole.
TABLE 38
STEWART'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1976 & 1977 TERMS
OCT. 1976 OCT. 1977JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Brennan 40.3% 32.7% - 7.6%
Marshall 36.9% 29.4% - 7.5%
CONSERVATIVES
Burger 23.6% 29.7% + 6.1%
Rehnquist 21.3% 34.4% +13.1%
Most interesting of all, Powell moved substantially away
from Rehnquist and Burger and toward Brennan and Mar-
shall. He was almost exactly in the statistical center of the
Court during the October 1977 Term, in striking contrast to
prior Terms when he voted as a core conservative in close
alignment with Burger and Rehnquist.
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TABLE 39
POWELL'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1976 & 1977 TERMS
OCT. 1976 OCT. 1977
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Brennan 41.9% 34.6% - 7.3%
Marshall 41.8% 34.4% - 7.4%
CONSERVATIVES
Burger 16.3% 29.8% + 13.5%
Rehnquist 17.1% 37.1% +20.0%
Blackmun also moved farther away from Rehnquist and
Burger than he had ever been before. Table 40 shows how his
disagreement rates with the core conservatives jumped in the
mid-seventies.
TABLE 40
BLACKMUN'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1973 & 1977 TERMS
OCT. 1973 OCT. 1977
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Brennan 42.8% 42.2% - 0.6%
Marshall 42.6% 41.7% - 0.9%
CONSERVATIVES
Burger 10.9% 33.9% +23.0%
Rehnquist 14.7% 41.3% +26.6%
Blackmun's 33.9% disagreement rate with Burger suggests
that the nickname Minnesota Twins had ceased to be
appropriate.
In contrast to White, Stewart, Powell, and Blackmun,
Stevens moved to the right during the October 1977 Term.
After being the third most liberal Justice in the prior two
Terms, he moved to the right of White, Stewart, and Powell
into the fourth most conservative position, a little to the right
of center.
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TABLE 41
STEVENS' DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1976 & 1977 TERMS
OCT. 1976 OCT. 1977
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Brennan 28.5% 35.8% +7.3%
Marshall 28.9% 32.8% +3.9%
CONSERVATIVES
Burger 36.1% 30.7% -5.4%
Rehnquist 40.2% 34.6% 
-5.6%
As a result of all these developments, the alignment on
the Court was much different than in prior Terms. There were
two conservatives, two liberals, and five Justices in the center.
The following table shows the alignment of the Justices dur-
ing the Term.8
TABLE 42
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES-OCTOBER 1977 TERM
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Brennan Blackmun D Rehnquist
Marshall Stevens 0 Burger
Powell 0
Stewart
_ White
This pattern suggests that the Burger Court might be entering
a new period in which control is passing from the core con-
servative bloc to the center."
The balance of power shifted to the left during the
Term. 7 After seven consecutive Terms in which liberals cast a
35. The arrows indicate the pole toward which the Justice leaned.
36. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979), which ends with the
following sentence: "The center was in control." Id. at 444.
37. Liberal victories in divided cases included: Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478(1978) (5-4; violation of civil rights); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (7-2;
criminal procedure; search and seizure); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104 (1978) (6-3; eminent domain); Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978) (7-2; violation of civil rights); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.
v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (6-3; procedural due process; cut-off of utilities); Elkins v.
Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978) (7-2; equal protection; nonresident college tuition); New
York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1978) (6-3; freedom of religion).
On the other hand, there were many important conservative victories as well
during the October 1977 Term. E.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
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disproportionate share of the dissents, the distribution of dis-
sents in the October 1977 Term was much more evenly
balanced.
TABLE 43
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1976 & 1977 TERMS
OCT. 1976 OCT. 1977
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Brennan 37.3% 34.3% -3.0%
Marshall 35.57o 28.3% -7.2%
CONSERVATIVES
Burger 16.8% 22.5% +5.7%
Rehnquist 21.8% 30.2% +8.4%
To summarize, the voting data suggest a general shift to
the left during the October 1977 Term. White, Stewart, Pow-
ell, and Blackmun moved away from the Rehnquist-Burger
pole. Instead of the six conservative-three liberal alignment of
prior Terms, the Court shifted toward a 2-5-2 alignment. The
conservative wing lost its cohesion, and even the Minnesota
Twins, Burger and Blackmun, disagreed in one-third of the
cases. Dissents on the left were down, while dissents on the
right were up. The overall picture was much more balanced
than during prior Terms when the Court was dominated by
the four core conservatives.
J. The October 1978 Terms3
During the final Term of its first decade, the Burger
Court shifted back toward the pattern of conservative domi-
nance that had characterized most of its prior Terms.8 ' The
(5-4; free speech); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (5-3;
contract clause); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (5-3; criminal proce-
dure; search and seizure); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (7-2; criminal
procedure; search and seizure); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589
(1978) (5-4; access to White House tape recordings); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978) (6-3; equal protection; aliens); Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78
(1978) (6-3; due process; student dismissals).
38. No personnel changes occurred during the Term.
39. Important conservative victories included: Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443
U.S. 368 (1979) (5-4; criminal procedure; public access to court proceedings); Califano
v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (5-4; equal protection; sex discrimination); Mackey v.
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979) (5-4; due process; suspension of drivers' licenses);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (6-3; due process; commitment of child); Person-
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dissent rates of Rehnquist and Burger dropped substantially.
In contrast, Marshall's dissent rate increased, and both Bren-
nan and Marshall dissented in more than one-third of the
cases they participated in.
TABLE 44
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1978 TERM
JUSTICE DISSENT RATE CHANGE
LIBERALS
Brennan 33.6% - 0.7%
Marshall 33.8% + 5.5%
CONSERVATIVES
Burger 13.8% - 8.7%
Rehnquist 19.4% -10.8%
For the fourth straight Term, Brennan and Marshall occupied
one polar extreme, Rehnquist and Burger the other. Rehn-
quist disagreed with both Brennan and Marshall in more than
fifty percent of the cases.
Once again, there was a shuffling of places among the re-
maining Justices. Powell moved sharply to the right, back into
the core of the conservative wing near Burger, as the following
table shows.
nel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (7-2; equal protection; sex discrimination);
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)
(5-4; parole of prisoners); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (5-4; free speech; pris-
oners' rights); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (5-4; equal protection; illegiti-
mates); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (6-3; free speech; defamation); Ambach
v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (5-4; equal protection; aliens); Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367 (1979) (5-4; criminal procedure; right to counsel); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128 (1978) (5-4; criminal procedure; "standing" to raise constitutional objections).
There were also several important liberal victories during the Term. E.g., Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (5-4; race relations; school desegrega-
tion); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Pennick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (7-2; race relations;
school desegregation); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (5-2; race
relations; affirmative action); Califano v. Westscott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (5-4; equal
protection; sex discrimination); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (5-4; equal
protection; sex discrimination); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (5-4; equal
protection; sex discrimination); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (7-2; dor-
mant commerce clause); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (6-3; right of pri-
vacy; abortions; vagueness).
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TABLE 45
POWELL'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1977 & 1978 TERMS
OCT. 1977 OCT. 1978
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Brennan 34.6% 41.1% + 6.5%
Marshall 34.4% 41.7% + 7.3%
CONSERVATIVES
Burger 29.8% 13.0% -16.8%
Rehnquist 37.1% 21.5% -15.6%
Other Justices moved toward the right as well.4 Stewart
moved to the right of Blackmun into closer proximity with
Rehnquist and Burger. White moved from left to right of
center.
Stevens, in contrast, moved to the left. He was the third
most liberal Justice, as he had been in his first two Terms.
TABLE 46
STEVENS' DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1977 & 1978 TERMS
OCT. 1977 OCT. 1978
JUSTICE TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Brennan 35.8% 26.6% -9.2%
Marshall 32.8% 26.2% -6.6%
CONSERVATIVES
Burger 30.7% 34.1% + 3.4%
Rehnquist 34.6% 36.8% +2.2%
Of the five "center" Justices, only Stevens was closer to Bren-
nan and Marshall than to Rehnquist and Burger.
Blackmun, unlike Powell, did not return to the core of
the conservative bloc. He occupied a rather moderate position,
slightly right of the Court's center. The following table con-
trasts Blackmun's voting record with those of the other three
Nixon appointees.
40. See appendix A, table 10 infra.
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TABLE 47
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1978 TERM
[Vol. 21
Blackmun Powell Burger Rehnquist
LIBERALS
Brennan 32.8% 41.1% 46.1% 53.5%
Marshall 30.0% 41.7% 46.2% 53.5%
CONSERVATIVES
Burger 20.8% 13.0% 13.2%
Rehnquist 26.4% 21.5%
To summarize, the October 1978 Term witnessed a return
of the conservative dominance that characterized most of the
1970's. Powell, Stewart, and White moved to the right. Only
Stevens moved to the left. Dissent rates on the right dropped,
and those on the left remained high. The Burger Court's first
decade ended on a strongly conservative note.
III. TRENDS DURING THE FIRST DECADE OF THE BURGER ERA
A. Voting Patterns
Conservative dominance was the most salient feature of
the Burger Court's first decade. Chief Justice Burger's first
Term, the October 1969 Term, saw a sharp -turn to the right
and a prompt end of the liberal dominance that had charac-
terized the last seven Terms of the Warren era. Conservative
dominance was established in Burger's second Term, which
saw the arrival of Blackmun. The seating of Powell and Rehn-
quist during the October 1971 Term made the conservative
control even more complete. From that time forward, the
Court was largely controlled by a coalition of four core con-
servatives and two moderate conservatives.
The extent of conservative dominance may be seen by
comparing the dissent rates of the Court's liberal and con-
servative justices.41 Consider, for example, the dissent rates of
the three liberals and four conservatives during the period be-
ginning with the October 1970 Term.
41. See appendix B, tables 1-10 infra.
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TABLE 48
DATA CONCERNING DISSENTS-OCTOBER 1970-1978 TERMS
DISSENT
CASES DISSENTS RATE AVERAGE
LIBERALS
Douglas 615 280 45.5%
Brennan 1132 386 34.1% 35.3%
Marshall 1148 356 31.0%
CONSERVATIVES
Blackmun 1133 136 12.0%
Powell 934 110 11.8%
Burger 1162 171 14.7%
Rehnquist 972 206 21.2%
Table 48 shows a dramatic imbalance. The average dissent
rate of the liberals (35.3%) was nearly two and one-half times
as high as that of the core conservatives (14.8%).
Let us examine the composition of the conservative wing
that dominated the Court during the first decade of the Bur-
ger era. There were four core conservatives, Rehnquist, Bur-
ger, Powell, and Blackmun. The two most conservative Jus-
tices were William H. Rehnquist and Warren E. Burger.
During each Term after the October 1971 Term, Rehnquist
was the Court's most conservative member. In fact, during
each Term, he disagreed with each of the liberals more than
any other Justice did.2 Similarly, with the possible exception
of the October 1970 and 1971 Terms, Burger was consistently
more conservative than any Justice other than Rehnquist.
The following table illustrates the tremendous gulf between
Rehnquist and Burger and the Court's liberal wing.
42. See appendix A, tables 4-10 infra.
19811
93(0 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21
TABLE 49
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1971, 1972, 1973 & 1976 TERMS
OCT. DISAGREEMENT RATES
TERM JUSTICE Douglas Brennan Marshall Rehnquist
1971 Rehnquist 61.5% 48.5% 53.0% -
Burger 60.9% 47.2% 44.2% 9.1%
1972 Rehnquist 66.2% 58.2% 55.2%
Burger 57.9% 48.9% 45.2% 15.8%
1973 Rehnquist 62.7% 53.6% 51.5%
Burger 55.9% 47.1% 47.1% 9.4%
1976 Rehnquist - 58.2% 56.5%
Burger 52.0% 52.0% 10.9%
The disagreement rates between the extremes were exception-
ally high.48 When two Justices disagree in six out of every ten
cases, there is obviously a profound difference of viewpoint
about what the Court should be doing. There have been only
three other times in the history of the Court (the 1790's, the
Vinson era, and late 1950's) when disagreement rates have ap-
proached these levels.
The third core conservative of the 1970's was Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. He agreed with Rehnquist and Burger much more
than with the liberals.
TABLE 50
POWELL'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1971-1978 TERMS
OCT. LIBERALS CONSERVATIVES
TERM Douglas Brennan Marshall Burger Rehnquist
1971 58.1% 50.8% 54.0% 7.9% 11.7%
1972 51.5% 42.6% 38.6% 15.9% 19.8%
1973 50.4% 41.4% 40.2% 14.3% 14.5%
1974 53.0% 40.4% 30.4% 12.2% 22.6%
1975 40.7% 38.6% 9.6% 18.5%
1976 41.9% 41.8% 16.3% 17.1%
1977 34.6% 34.4% 29.8% 37.1%
1978 41.1% 41.7% 13.0% 21.5%
Average 52.5% 41.2% 39.1% 15.3% 20.8%
43. The 66.2% disagreement rate between Rehnquist and Douglas during the
October 1973 Term was the highest one-Term disagreement rate since 1793. This
conclusion is based on studies of disagreement rates undertaken by the author.
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As Table 50 shows, Powell sided decisively with the conserva-
tives in all Terms except the October 1977 Term. He was
closer to Burger than to any other Justice." Clearly Powell
deserves the overall label of core conservative. The deeply
conservative character of the Burger Court is dramatically il-
lustrated by the fact that Powell had the lowest average dis-
sent rate of all the Justices during the 1970's.
The fourth core conservative was Harry A. Blackmun.
During his first Term, Blackmun was arguably the Court's
most conservative member. Thereafter he and Powell nor-
mally held down the third and fourth most conservative posi-
tions. Toward the end of the 1970's, Blackmun's ties with the
conservatives loosened considerably, and later historians may
conclude that he was a moderate conservative rather than a
core conservative by the end of this period.
TABLE 51
BLACKMUN'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1970-1978 TERMS
OCT. LIBERALS CONSERVATIVES
TERM Douglas Brennan Marshall Burger Rehnquist
1970 53.9% 41.5% 38.7% 4.7%
1971 57.9% 42.4% 39.4% 11.0% 12.5%
1972 54.3% 41.4% 39.1% 10.9% 24.8%
1973 51.5% 42.8% 42.6% 10.9% 14.7%
1974 47.7% 30.3% 30.9% 13.0% 17.9%
1975 41.2% 39.1% 13.2% 21.3%
1976 40.0% 39.8% 16.1% 21.1%
1977 42.2% 41.7% 33.9% 41.3%
1978 32.8% 30.0% 20.8% 26.4%
Average 53.2% 39.3% 38.0% 14.8% 22.8%
The following table charts the voting relationship of the
Minnesota Twins, Burger and Blackmun. The two began the
1970's in close alignment. They drifted apart a little during
the mid-1970's. Toward the end of the 1970's, their disagree-
ment rate increased substantially, making their old nickname
no longer apt.
44. In fact, Powell was closer to Burger than was Blackmun, Burger's Minne-
sota Twin.
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TABLE 52
DISAGREEMENT RATES BETWEEN BURGER & BLACKMUN
TERM DISAGREEMENT RATE
O ct. 1970 ................................. 4.7%
O ct. 1971 .................................. 11.0 %
O ct. 1972 .................................. 10.9%
O ct. 1973 .................................. 10.9%
O ct. 1974 .................................. 13.0 %
O ct. 1975 .................................. 13.2%
O ct. 1976 .................................. 16.1%
O ct. 1977 .................................. 33.9%
O ct. 1978 .............. ................... 20.8%
The dominance of the four Nixonian core conservatives
was secured by the support of the Court's two moderate con-
servatives, Byron R. White and Potter Stewart. White began
his career as a moderate and remained pretty much in" the
center of the Warren Court, despite some tendency toward
the right. Soon after the appointment of Burger, White moved
sharply to the right. By the October 1972 Term, he was
squarely in the center of the conservative bloc to the right of
both Blackmun and Powell. Thereafter he moved back toward
the center. In the October 1977 Term, he was arguably a little
left of center.
TABLE 53
WHITE'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1969-1978 TERMS
OCT. LIBERALS CONSERVATIVES
TERM Douglas Brennan Burger Rehnquist
1969 35.3% 18.4% 27.1%
1970 46.1% 31.1% 15.1%
1971 46.1% 29.1% 22.5% 24.2%
1972 57.2% 42.9% 19.6% 19.7%
1973 44.9% 30.0% 18.6% 25.4%
i974 46.7% 27.9% 16.3% 22.0%
1975 
- 37.0% 15.2% 23.2%
1976 38.1% 20.8% 28.2%
1977 
- 31.5% 34.9% 40.3%
1978 - 30.7% 24.8% 32.0%
Average 46.4% 32.2% 21.3% 28.0%
White's overall pattern was conservative rather than liberal.
Now let us examine the voting pattern of Stewart, the
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Court's second moderate conservative. When he first arrived
on the Court in 1958, Stewart joined the coalition of moder-
ates and conservatives who briefly rolled back the liberal
activism that had emerged during the 1954-1957 period." Af-
ter the decimation of the conservative wing in 1962 and the
establishment of the five-vote liberal majority, Stewart be-
came the Court's second most conservative member and re-
mained in that position throughout the 1962-1969 period of
liberal dominance. During the first decade of the Burger era,
Stewart continued to be a moderate conservative. He was
closer to the liberals than the four core conservatives were,
but he normally leaned toward the conservative rather than
the liberal side.
TABLE 54
STEWART'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1969-1978 TERMS
OCT. LIBERALS CONSERVATIVES
TERM Douglas Brennan Burger Rehnquist
1969 38.8% 27.6% 20.0%
1970 49.5% 34.6% 18.7%
1971 35.7% 24.8% 29.9% 32.3%
1972 40.3% 36.6% 33.6% 38.3%
1973 46.2%. 37.3% 19.4% 21.2%
1974 42.1% 36.1% 22.0% 29.3%
1975 40.9% 24.8% 25.5%
1976 40.3% 23.6% 21.3%
1977 32.7% 29.7% 34.4%
1978 38.1% 19.5% 22.0%
Average 42.0% 35.3% 24.4% 27.9%
As the table suggests, Stewart was close to the center in the
October 1971, 1972, and 1977 Terms. During the other seven
Terms he was substantially right of center.
John Paul Stevens was not on the Court long enough to
allow firm conclusions about his voting patterns. During his
first two Terms he was the Court's third most liberal member.
In his third Term, he moved substantially to the right. In his
fourth Term, he once again was the third most liberal Justice.
45. Galloway, The Second Periid of the Warren Court: The Liberal Trend
Abates (1957-1961), 19 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 947 (1979).
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TABLE 55
STEVENS' DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1975-1978 TERMS
OCT. LIBERALS CONSERVATIVES
TERM Brennan Marshall Burger Rehnquist
1975 36.1% 38.6% 31.9% 33.3%
1976 28.5% 28.9% 36.1% 40.2%
1977 35.8% 32.8% 30.7% 34.6%
1978 26.6% 26.2% 34.1% 36.8%
Average 31.1% 30.8% 33.3% 36.4%
Thus, the preliminary indications suggested that Stevens was
a moderate with a slight inclination toward the left.
The Court's liberal wing was reduced to minority status
during the 1970's, after being dominant during the 1962-1969
period. The liberals' sudden fall from control and their dis-
content with the decisions of the Burger Court's dominant
conservative wing are illustrated in the following table.
TABLE 56
DISSENT RATES OF THE LIBERALS-OCTOBER 1967-1978 TERMS
OCT.
TERM Douglas Brennan Marshall ERA
1967 15.2% 3.7% 1.6% Liberal
1968 18.3% 1.9% 6.7% Dominance
(1962-69)
1969 27.9% 12.5% 5.1% Transition
1970 41.3% 29.6% 27.1%
1971 43.8% 31.5% 25.6%
1972 50.7% 34.8% 32.6%
1973 45.6% 37.1% 35.5% Conservative
1974 44.9% 28.7% 24.4% Dominance
1975 38.4% 34.8% (1970-78)
1976 37.3% 35.5%
1977 34.3% 28.3%
1978 33.6% 33.8%
50.7% dissent rate
highest since 1793.
October 1975 Term)
during the October 1972 Term
The dissent rates of Brennan
and Marshall (35.5%; October
1973 and 1976 Terms) reached record levels for them. Beyond
doubt, the liberals were unhappy with the trend of Burger
Court decisions.
Douglas'
was the
(38.4 %;
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B. Substantive Legal Trends
This article has not analyzed the legal developments that
occurred during the Burger Court's first decade of conserva-
tive dominance. Nevertheless, the reader is entitled at least to
a brief summary of legal trends. In general, the conservative
voting patterns that have been described in this article were
reflected in conservative substantive and procedural legal de-
velopments. Let us examine, first, the five substantive areas in
which the Warren Court's most famous liberal activist innova-
tions occurred: race relations, criminal procedure, free speech,
privacy, and legislative reapportionment.
During its first decade, the Burger Court inflicted a series
of severe defeats on racial minorities. The Court undercut the
Warren Court's equal protection revolution by holding that
the equal protection clause"4 prohibits only intentional racial
discrimination,4 7 by tightening the state action requirement,"8
and by restricting the power of federal courts to issue effective
remedies.' 9 After an initial period of relative liberalism, 0 the
Court laid to waste the most important civil rights statute,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 rolling back major
advances by lower federal courts. Having effectively shut the
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
47. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (zoning); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (employment tests); Milli-
ken v. Bradley (I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (school desegregation); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (school desegregation); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972) (welfare benefits).
48. E.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (warehouseman's lien);
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (cut off of electricity to resi-
dence); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (private clubs).
49. E.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (I), 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (school de-
segregation); Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976)
(same); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (same); NAACP v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) (federal licensees); Milliken v. Bradley
(I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (school desegregation); Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational
Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974) (selection of government officials).
50. E.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (retroactive sen-
iority); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (written tests; back pay);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1972) (written tests).
51. See in chronological order, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431
U.S. 395 (1977); United Air Lines Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977). The 1977 trilogy
was a clear signal to the lower courts to curtail the liberal activism that had been
dominant in Title VII cases throughout the early 1970's. The lower courts responded
with a vengeance. As a result, the flood of Title VII class actions on behalf of racial
and national minorities has slowed to a trickle.
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door on the Warren Court's racial equality revolution, the
Court reopened it to some extent in a series of more moderate
decisions issued toward the end of the decade. 2 The cumula-
tive effect of the decade's decisions, however, was a grievous
weakening of the advance toward racial justice that character-
ized prior years.
The Burger Court answered the Warren Court's criminal
procedure revolution by firmly embracing the "law and order"
principles that President Nixon espoused and explicitly
sought in his appointees. The Court terminated the Warren
Court's equal protection revolution on behalf of indigent crim-
inal defendants.5 3 It limited the right to counsel. 4 It undercut
Miranda in a series of cases. 5 It restricted the exclusionary
rule56 and otherwise eroded the fourth amendment. 57 It elimi-
nated safeguards against mistaken identifications. 8 It watered
down jury trial requirements.5 9 It reinstated capital punish-
ment.60 It drastically reduced the availability of habeas
52. E.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (II), 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (school de-
segregation); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (school desegrega-
tion); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (affirmative action); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (special admissions); Castenada v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (jury discrimination); Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976) (private schools; Civil Rights Act of 1866); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284
(1976) (housing); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (employ-
ment; Civil Rights Act of 1866).
53. E.g., United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976); Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600 (1974); Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
54. E.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
55. E.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96 (1975); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
56. E.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
57. E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (standing); Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (third-party evidence searches); Scott v. United States, 436
U.S. 128 (1978) (electronic surveillance); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976) (inventory searches); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (search of
attorney's files); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (warrantless arrests);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (searches incident to arrest);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent searches); Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (stops and frisks); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971) (consent monitoring).
58. E.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); United States v. Ash, 413
U.S. 300 (1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
59. E.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78 (1970).
60. E.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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corpus." Overall, the Court placed a higher value on crime
control than on constitutional protections and emphasized the
need for eliminating federal interference with local law en-
forcement policies. Although many libertarian decisions were
also issued, the overall trend was undoubtedly conservative.
The Burger Court's record in free speech cases during its
first decade was mixed. In several important areas, character-
istic conservative retrenchment took place. The Court rolled
back the Warren Court's "public defamation revolution." 2 It
restored the ability of government officials to prosecute ob-
scenity effectively. 3 It undercut the access of relatively indi-
gent, grass-roots groups to means for expression of their
views."' It terminated the Court's role as guardian of public
demonstrators. 5 Most notoriously, it conducted a vendetta
against the press, substantially curtailing the immunities and
access rights of news media." On the other hand, the Court
held the line against prior restraints 7 and even engaged in an
activist campaign to expand protections for corporate speech"
and commercial speech.69 Overall, the Court's commitment to
the first amendment was spotty at best.
The Burger Court gained something of a reputation for
liberal activism in one noteworthy line of cases involving the
right of privacy. The Court held, for the first time, that preg-
61. E.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976).
62. E.g., Wolston v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
63. E.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); cf FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976).
64. E.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
65. E.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
66. E.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438
U.S. 1 (1978); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Nixon v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
67. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
68. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
69. E.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). But see Ohralik v. State Bar, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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nant women have a constitutional right to an abortion7 0 and
issued a variety of secondary decisions implementing 1 and
eroding7 2 that right. The Court confirmed and extended the
constitutional right of privacy in cases involving the use of
contraceptives,7" the decision to marry,7 ' and the decision of
family members to live togethers.7  Beyond that, however, the
Court adopted a restrained position concerning the right of
privacy 76 which led at least one observor to conclude, "[lit is
likely that constitutional privacy will be relegated to the sta-
tus of a 'limbo' doctrine . . .
The legislative reapportionment revolution of which Earl
Warren was so proud7 s held up reasonably well during the
first decade of the Burger era.7 9 Yet, the patterns of conserva-
tism and retrenchment characteristic of the Burger Court
were present in this area as well. The Court softened the one-
person-one-vote rule by allowing minor deviations (up to ten
percent) without any justification"0 and substantial deviations
(up to twenty percent) where supported by rational grounds 1
and by stressing deference to state legislative judgments.82
The Court shut down challenges against multi-member
70. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
71. E.g., Bellotti v. Baird (II), 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
72. E.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), and companion cases.
73. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); cf. Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
74. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
75. E.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
76. E.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,
425 U.S. 901 (1976); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
77. Silver, The Future of Constitutional Privacy, 21 ST. Louis U.L. REv. 211,
215 (1977).
78. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and its many progeny, including
especially Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S.
526 (1969); and Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
79. E.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690
(1971).
80. E.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (9.9% deviation); Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (7.83% deviation). But cf Chapman v. Meier, 420
U.S. 1 (1975) (stricter standards for court-ordered reapportionment).
81. E.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (16.4% deviation); Abate v.
Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971) (12% deviation).
82. E.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735 (1973). But cf White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973) (no need for deference re
federal voting districts).
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electoral districts by formulating an extremely loose test."3 Fi-
nally, the Court continued the restrained pattern set by the
Warren Court in racial gerrymander cases. 4 All in all, the
Burger Court's decisions in this area "trace a retreat to the
safety of judicial noninvolvement." 85
In cases involving essentially economic interests, the
Burger Court terminated the "egalitarian revolution" that had
characterized the Warren era. The Court returned to a pos-
ture of restraint with regard to government activities ad-
versely affecting the poor. It undercut the foundations of pov-
erty law by holding that poverty is not a suspect
classification88 and denying that subsistence benefits are a
fundamental right.8 7 It retrenched in the area of equal protec-
tion for indigent criminal defendants.8 It restricted the proce-
dural due process rights of welfare recipients, 89 debtors,90 and
other persons harmed by government action.9 1 It set aside the
Warren Court's rule that "the government always wins" in an-
titrust cases.9 2 It dramatically restricted the rights of indi-
gents to free access to judicial proceedings.es Moreover, a
number of cases suggested renewed conservative activism, i.e.,
a willingness on the part of the Court to intervene actively in
83. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971). But cf. Chapman v. Meier, 420
U.S. 1 (1975) (stricter standards for court-ordered reapportionment); White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (multi-member districts held invidiously
discriminatory).
84. E.g., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (redistricting with
adverse effect on Jewish community); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976)
(nonretrogression principle for redistricting under the Voting Rights Act of 1965);
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (racially motivated annexa-
tion upheld).
85. Comment, Judicial Deference in the Representation Controversy: A Fur-
ther Erosion of the Justiciability Doctrine, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 143, 143 (1977).
86. E.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
87. E.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
88. E.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
89. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 339 (1971).
90. E.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). But see North Ga.
Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
91. E.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).
92. For a discusson of cases illustrating this change see Pollock, Antitrust, the
Supreme Court, and the Spirit of '76, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 631-55 (1977).
93. E.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434 (1973).
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order to advance the interests of the rich.94 The overall record
was deeply conservative.
Perhaps the most widely noted trend in the first decade
of the Burger era was the Court's insistence upon "closing the
courthouse doors," i.e., restricting access to federal courts and
availability of federal remedies.96 The Court used traditional
threshold doctrines to create formidable obstacles to judicial
review. The rules of standing were tightened drastically and
constitutionalized6 The "case or controversy" 97  and jus-
ticiability" doctrines were used to dismiss important cases in-
volving alleged abuse of governmental power. The availability
of federal habeas corpus was reduced substantially." The ab-
stention doctrine became a major barrier to federal litiga-
tion.100 The Warren Court's presumption in favor of private
causes of action to enforce statutory rights was converted into
a presumption against private causes of action.101 Rules con-
cerning pendant jurisdiction were tightened. 02 Those litigants
who managed to survive the gauntlet of threshold obstacles
94. E.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,
431 U.S. 1 (1977); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
95. See, e.g., Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. Rv. 1191(1977). The leaders in this development were Rehnquist, Burger, and Powell.
96. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Rich-
ard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); see, e.g., Sedler Standing and the Burger Court, 30
RUTGERS L. REV. 863 (1977).
97. E.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488
(1974).
98. E.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1(1972).
99. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
100. The leading case in this important area was Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37(1971). The progeny of Younger included: Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977);Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). See, e.g., Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in
the Doctrine of Equitable Restraint: A Critical Analysis, 1976 DuKE L.J. 523.
101. E.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Securities InvestorProtection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); see, e.g., Pillai, Negative Im-plication: The Demise of Private Rights of Action in the Federal Courts, 47 U. CINN.
L. REV. 1 (1978) (concluding that private causes of action are an "endangered
species").
102. E.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
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found themselves up against newly imposed procedural obsta-
cles.109 Perhaps most important of all, the Court imposed far-
reaching restrictions on the ability of lower federal courts to
issue effective remedies.104 The Court's recurrent obsession
was to reduce the case load of the federal courts, and its mes-
sage to the federal judges was to dismiss the cases without
reaching the merits. In the long run, this position may result
in greater detriment to aggrieved citizens than all the in-
stances of substantive retrenchment mentioned above.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1969-1972 period saw one of the most decisive short-
term revolutions in personnel in the history of the United
States Supreme Court. During the October 1968 Term, the
liberals exercised total dominance. After a single Term of
transition, the conservatives attained dominance in the Octo-
ber 1970 Term and held it throughout the 1970's except dur-
ing the October 1977 Term. Indeed, the three remaining per-
sonnel changes-the arrival of Rehnquist and Powell, and the
departure of Douglas-merely made the conservative domi-
nance more complete. A coalition of four core conservatives
(Rehnquist, Burger, Powell, and Blackmun) and two moderate
conservatives (White and Stewart) controlled the direction of
the Court. The liberal minority functioned as a loyal opposi-
tion, expressing their losing views in hundreds of dissenting
opinions.
103. E.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (class actions); Eisen v. Car-
lisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (class actions); Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291 (1973) (class actions).
104. E.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1975); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Milliken v. Bradley (II), 418 U.S. 717 (1974);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974);
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973);
see, e.g., Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger
Court, 13 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 1 (1978); Morrison, Rights without
Remedies: The Burger Court Takes the Federal Courts Out of the Business of Pro-
tecting Federal Rights, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 841 (1977).
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1969 TERM
[Vol. 21
Douglas ", b 22.1 18.2 35.3 35.3 38.8 41.2 48.8
tc 19/86 14/77 30/85 30/85 33/85 35/85 41/84
Brennan 6.4 37.9 18.4 27.6 27.6 39.5
5/78 :13/87 16/87 24/87 24/87 34/86
Marshall 28.6 15.4 24.7 20.8 36.4
22/77 12/78 19/77 16/77 28/77
Black 31.4 36.0 39.5 37.6
27/86 31/86 34/86 32/85
White 24.4 19.8 27.1
21/86 17/86 23/85
Stewart 19.8 20.0
_ _ 17/86 17/85
Harlan 17.6
_ _ _ 15/85
Burger
a Total number of cases in which justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both justices participated
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TABLE 2
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1970 TERM
Douglas ",b 23.3 22.5 35.0 46.6 49.5 46.1 
52.4 53.9
PC 24/103 23/102 36/103 48/103 51/103 47/102 54/103 55/102
Brennan 14.2 33.6 38.3 34.6 31.1 
42.1 41.5
o 15/106 :16/107 41/107 37/107 33/106 45/107 44/106
Marshall 35.8 29.9 32.1 34.9 
38.7 40.0
M 38/106 32/107 34/106 37/106 41/106 42/105
Black 37.4 38.3 34.0 
25.2 29.0
o 40/107 41/107 36/106 27/107 31/107
Harlan 19.6 
28.0 21.5 21.7
0 21/107 30/107 23/107 23/106
Stewart
23.6
25/106
18.7
20/107
19.8
21/106
1hit 15.1 15.2
White # 16/106 16/105
4.7
Burger 5/106
Blackmun
a Total number of cases in which justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both justices participated
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TABLE 3
DISAGREEMENT RATEs-OcToBER 1971 TERM
Douglas %b 23.0 24.2 35.7 46.1 57.9 60.9 58.1 61.5
nc 29/126 31/128 45/126 59/128 73/126 78/128 36/62 36/62
Brennan 18.1 24.8 29.1 42.4 47.2 50.8 48.5
23/127 31/125 37/127 53/125 60/127 31/61 32/66
Marshall 18.9 31.0 39.4 44.2 54.0 53.0
24/127 40/129 50/127 57/129 34/63 35/66
Stewart % 22.0 27.2 29.9 31.7 32.3
28/127 34/125 38/127 20/63 21/65
White 15.7 22.5 28.6 24.2# 20/127 29/129 18/63 16/66
Blackmun 11.0 19.7 12.5
_ _ 14/127 12/61 8/64
Burger 7.9 9.1# 5/63 6/66
Powell 11.7
07/60
Rehnquist
#
a Total number of cases in which justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both justices participated
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TABLE 4
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1972 TERM
Douglas ,b 27.4 23.7 40.3 51.5 54.3 
57.2 57.9 66.2
oc 33/135 32/135 54/134 68/132 75/138 79/138 81/140 92/139
Brennan I 12.8 36.6 42.6 
41.4 42.9 48.9 58.2
# 16/125 48/131 55/129 55/133 57/133 66/135 78/134
Marshall % 34.9 38.6 39.1 
40.6 45.2 55.2
. 45/129 49/127 52/133 54/133 61/135 74/134
Stewart 26.6 30.1 
38.6 33.6 38.3
O 34/128 40/133 51/132 45/134 51/133
Powell 17.4 
20.8 15.9 19.8
# 2:3/132 27/130 21/132 26/131
Blackmun 
17.6 10.9 24.8
# 24/136 15/138 34/137
White 
19.6 19.7
27/138 27/137
Burger 
15.8
# 22/139
Rehnquist
a Total number of cases in which justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both justices participated
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TABLE 5
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1973 TERM
Douglas .b 19.9 21.6 44.9 46.2 50.4 51.5 55.9 62.7Sc 27/136 29/134 61/136 60/130 65/129 69/134 76/136 84/134
Brennan , 7.2 30.0 37.3 41.4 42.8 47.1 53.6
10/138 42/140 50/134 55/133 59/138 66/140 74/138
Marshall 33.3 34.8 40.2 42.6 47.1 51.5
46/138 46/132 53/132 58/136 65/138 70/136
White 24.6 21.8 19.6 18.6 25.45 33/134 29/133 27/138 26/140 35/138
Stewart 14.8 20.5 19.4 21.25 19/128 27/132 26/134 28/132
Powell 18.8 14.3 14.5# 25/133 19/133 19/131
Blackmun 10.9 14.7# 15/138 20/136
Burger % 9.4# 13/138
Rehnquist
a Total number of cases in which justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both justices participated
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TABLE 6
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1974 TERM
Douglas "b 21.5 29.0 42.1 46.7 47.7 53.0 56.1 60.7
Sc 23/107 31/107 45/107 50/107 51/107 53/100 60/107 65/107
Brennan I 10.7 36.1 27.9 30.3 40.4 41.0 46.7
S 13/122 44/122 34/122 37/122 46/114 50/122 57/122
Marshall 26.8 24.4 30.9 30.4 36.6 42.3
6 33/123 30/123 38/123 35/115 45/123 52/123
Stewart 25.2 25.2 15.7 22.0 29.3
1* 31/123 31/123 18/115 27/123 36/123
White 17.9 18.3 16.3 22.0
22/123 21/115 20/123 27/123
Blackmun % 16.5 13.0 17.9
o 19/115 16/123 22/123
Powell % 12.2 22.66 14/115 26/115
f,. 13.8
Burger ".
It 17/123
Rehnquist
a Total number of cases in which justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both justices participated
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TABLE 7
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1975 TERM
Brennan 'b 5.9 36.1 40.9 37.0 41.2 40.7 47.8 58.7
#c 8/135 26/72 56/137 51/138 56/136 55/135 66/138 81/138
Marshall % 38.6 37.3 34.8 39.1 38.6 44.4 55.6
# 27/70 50/134 47/135 52/133 51/132 60/135 75/135
Stevens 33.3 33.3 32.4 25.7 31.9 33.3
# 24/72 24/72 23/71 18/70 23/72 24/72
Stewart 7 29.9 25.2 19.3 24.8 25.5
# 41/137 34/135 26/135 34/137 35/137
White 16.9 17.8 15.2 23.2
23/136 24/135 21/138 32/138
Blackmun % 15.8 13.2 21.3
P 21/133 18/136 29/136
Powell % 9.6 18.5
# 13/135 25/135
Burger % 10.9
# 15/138
Rehnquist %
a Total number of cases in which justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both justices participated
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TABLE 8
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1976 TERM
Brennan .b 7.3 28.5 38.1 40.3 40.0 41.9 52.0 
58.2
#C 9/124 35/123 48/126 50/124 50/125 52/124 65/125 64/110
Marshall , 28.9 34.7 36.9 39.8 41.8 52.0 
56.5
0 35/121 43/124 45/122 49/123 51/122 64/123 61/108
Stevens 26.8 27.3 31.1 28.1 36.1 
40.2
33/123 33/121 38/122 34/121 44/122 43/107
White 28.2 17.6 20.2 20.8 
28.2
0 35/124 22/125 25/124 26/125 31/110
Stewart 25.2 20.3 23.6 
21.3
# 31/123 25/123 29/123 23/108
Blackmun e 19.5 16.1 
21.1
# 24/123 20/124 23/109
Powell % 16.3 
17.1
20/123 21/123
Burger 10.9# 12/110
Rehnquist 0
a Total number of cases in which justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both justices participated
1981]
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TABLE 9
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1977 TERM
Brennan b 7.5 31.5 32.7 34.6 35.8 42.2 54.6 58.3
#c 8/106 34/108 35/107 36/104 38/106 :38/90 59/108 63/108
Marshall 29.9 29.4 34.4 32.8 41.7 45.7 53.5
5 38/127 37/126 42/122 41/125 45/108 58/127 68/127
White 31.3 32.3 34.6 28.4 34.9 40.3
0 40/128 40/124 44/127 31/109 45/129 52/129
Stewart 29.0 21.4 29.6 29.7 34.4
O 36/124 27/126 32/108 38/128 44/128
Powell 33.9 23.8 29.8 37.1
5 42/124 25/105 37/124 46/124
Stevens % 34.6 30.7 34.6
O 37/107 39/127 44/127
Blackmun % 33.9 41.3
0 37/109 45/109
Burger % 21.7
5t 28/129
Rehnquist S
a Total number of cases in which justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both justices participated
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TABLE 10
DISAGREEMENT RATES-OCTOBER 1978 TERM
Brennan b 7.0 26.6 30.7 32.8 38.1 41.1 46.1 53.5
#c 9/128 33/124 39/127 42/128 48/126 44/107 59/128 68/127
Marshall . 26.2 29.5 30.0 39.8 41.7 46.2 53.5
33/126 38/129 39/130 51/128 45/108 60/130 69/129
Stevens , 32.8 31.0 29.8 36.2 34.1 36.8
O 41/125 39/126 37/124 38/105 43/126 46/125
White 16.3 32.3 28.0 24.8 32.0.
# 21/129 41/127 30/107 32/129 41/128
Blackmun 29.7 25.9 20.8 26.4
38/128 28/108 27/130 34/129
Stewart , 21.5 19.5 22.0
23/107 25/128 28/127
Powell 15.0 21.5
14/108 23/107
Burger 13.2
# 17/129
Rehnquist
a Total number of cases in which justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both justices participated
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APPENDIX B
TABLE 1
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1969 TERM
[Vol. 21
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Douglas 86 24 27.9% + 5.7%
Brennan 88 11 12.5% +10.5%
Marshall 78 4 5.1% - 1.6%
Black 87 24 27.6% - 2.7%
White 87 9 10.3% - 6.0%
Stewart 87 17 19.5% -13.8%
Harlan 87 13 14.9% -17.8%
Burger 86 25 29.1% -- %
TABLE 2
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1970 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Douglas 104 43 41.3% + 13.4%
Brennan 108 32 29.6% + 17.1%
Marshall 107 29 27.1% +22.0%
Black 108 27 25.0% - 2.6%
Harlan 108 19 17.6% + 2.7%
Stewart 108 16 14.8% - 4.7%
White 107 18 16.8% + 6.5%
Burger 108 14 13.0% -16.1%
Blackmun 107 18 16.8% - %
1981] THE BURGER COURT
TABLE 3
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1971 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Douglas 128 56 43.8% + 2.5%
Brennan 127 40 31.5% + 1.9%
Marshall 129 33 25.6% - 1.5%
Stewart 127 15 11.8% - 3.0%
White 129 13 10.1% - 6.7%
Blackmun 127 21 16.5% - 0.3%
Burger 129 24 18.6% - 5.6%
Powell 63 12 19.0% - %
Rehnquist 66 11 16.7% - %
TABLE 4
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1972 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Douglas 140 71 50.7% + 6.9%
Brennan. 135 47 34.8% + 3.3%
Marihall 135 44 32.6% + 7.0%
Stewart 134 37 27.6% + 15.8%
Powell 132 14 10.6% - 8.4%
Blackmun 138 12 8.7% - 7.8%
White 138 18 13.0% + 2.9%
Burger 140 19 13.6% - 5.0%
Rehnquist 139 34 24.5% + 7.8%
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TABLE 5
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1973 TERM
[Vol. 21
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Douglas 136 62 45.6% - 5.1%
Brennan 140 52 37.1% + 2.3%
Marshall 138 49 35.5% + 2.9%White 140 19 13.6% + 0.6%Stewart 134 16 11.9% -15.7%
Powell 133 13 9.8% - 0.8%Blackmun 138 14 10.1% + 1.4%Burger 140 17 12.1% - 1.5%
Rehnquist 138 22 15.9% - 8.6%
TABLE 6
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1974 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Douglas 107 48 44.9% - 0.7%
Brennan 122 35 28.7% - 8.4%Marshall 123 30 24.4% - 10.9%Stewart 123 21 17.1% + 5.2%White 123 14 11.4% - 2.2%
Blackmun 123 10 8.1% - 2.0%Powell 115 13 11.3% + 1.5%
Burger 123 16 13.0% + 0.9%
Rehnquist 123 23 18.7% + 2.8%
1981] THE BURGER COURT
TABLE 7
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1975 TERM
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JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Brennan 138 53 38.4% + 9.7%
Marshall 135 47 34.8% + 10.4%
Stevens 72 19 26.4% - %
Stewart 137 25 18.2% + 1.1%
White 138 18 13.0% + 1.6%
Blackmun 136 15 11.0% + 2.9%
Powell 135 6 4.4% - 6.9%
Burger 138 13 9.4% - 3.6%
Rehnquist 138 28 20.3% + 1.6%
TABLE 8
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1976 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Brennan 126 47 37.3% -1.1%
Marshall 124 44 35.5% +0.7%
Stevens 123 25 20.3% -6.1%
Stewart 124 22 17.7% +0.5%
White 126 17 13.5% +0.5%
Blackmun 125 13 10.4% -0.6%
Powell 124 13 10.5% +6.1%
Burger 125 21 16.8% +7.4%
Rehnquist 110 24 21.8% + 1.5%
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TABLE 9
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1977 TERM
[Vol. 21
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Brennan 108 37 34.3% -3.0%
Marshall 127 36 28.3% -7.2%
White 129 27 20.9% +7.4%
Stewart 128 20 15.6% -2.1%
Powell 124 21 16.9% +6.4%
Stevens 127 26 20.5% -0.2%
Blackmun 109 20 18.3% +7.9%
Burger 129 29 22.5% +5.7%
Rehnquist 129 39 30.2% +8.4%
TABLE 10
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1978 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Brennan 128 43 33.6% - 0.7%
Marshall 130 44 33.8% + 5.5%
Stevens 126 32 25.4% + 4.9%
White 129 17 13.2% - 7.7%
Blackmun 130 13 10.0% - 8.3%
Stewart 128 25 19.5% + 3.9%
Powell 108 18 16.7% - 0.2%
Burger 130 18 13.8% - 8.7%
Rehnquist 129 25 19.4% -10.8%
